Select Page

The security analysis and proof of our system are presented in this section. Like the proposed PCA, it has been proven to be able to withstand all types of attacks. In addition, we analyze and compare the calculation of communication and bandwidth consumption of similar schemes. Proof. As shown in the introduction of the proposed scheme, an offline password change phase is envisaged. Any user can change their password locally. If the user enters correctly, the accuracy of and , that is, the user has a high probability of making the local password change. As a result, the proposed pKAS scheme may result in an offline password change. When analyzing the communication requirements between the user and the Edge Server, there are two types of roles in our system, e.B.

Users who communicate with the server, a trusted authority (TA) can be considered a trusted administrator and cannot be compromised by any adversary. When it comes to user authentication and key agreement, a user must (suppose they are registered in the TA), and then they can perform mutual authentication and key agreement with other users of the Edge Cloud Server (e.B.) only using the password and smart card. Many key exchange systems allow one party to generate the key and simply send that key to the other party – the other party has no influence on the key. Using a key memorandum of understanding avoids some of the major distribution issues associated with such systems. The wireless sensor network (WSN) is a very important part of the Internet of Things (IoT), especially in online healthcare applications. Among them, wireless medical sensor networks (WMSNs) have been used in personalized health systems (PHS). In recent years, professionals have used their mobile devices to access data collected by sensors placed in or on patients` bodies. Due to the danger of wireless transmission, the security of data collected by sensors and also transmitted to doctors faces challenges. Over the past decade, many authentication schemes for WMSNs have been proposed.

However, security drawbacks have been identified in such systems. To overcome historical security issues, we offer a robust and lightweight authentication scheme for WMSNs that meets common security requirements and keeps user tracking away from attackers. The popular proverif tool is used to express that our schema resists simulated attacks. An informal security analysis will also be demonstrated. With the comparison with several very current schemes and the simulation by NS-3, the proposed scheme is suitable for PHS. A variety of cryptographic authentication schemes and protocols are designed to provide an authenticated key agreement to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks and related attacks. These methods usually mathematically link the agreed key to other agreed dates, such as .B. the following sections present the four phases of the proposed system.

In summary, it can be said that the pKAS presented, which consumes less communication and calculations than [33, 35]. Although the cost of [36] is lower than that of pKAS, the system cannot be protected against counterfeiting and insider attacks, and its bandwidth consumption is relatively large. In addition, pKAS is safer than [33, 35, 36]. pKAS is therefore better suited for users and servers to check each other. Anonymity is one of the important features of two-factor authentication schemes for wireless sensor networks (WSNs) to protect user privacy. While impressive efforts have been put into designing schemas with user anonymity using only lightweight symmetric key primitives such as hash functions and block ciphers, to our knowledge, none have succeeded so far. In this work, we take a first step to shed light on the reasons for this important topic. First, we look at two previously thought out sound patterns, namely the diagram of Fan et al. and the scheme of Xue et al., and demonstrate the biggest challenges in designing a schema with user anonymity. Proof.

To eliminate the danger of an online password rate attack, is included in the proposed scheme. As an analysis of Proposition 1, the proposed pASK can be used to prevent online rate attacks. Therefore, the proposed pKAS system can be safe against online password rate attacks. The results of the comparison in Table 4 are based on assumptions such as the result of the 160-bit hash function, the 128-bit random number, the 64-bit identifier, the 32-bit timestamp, and the 320-bit encryption/decryption and ECC point. Table 5 shows a comparison of communication costs between pKAS and other schemes [33, 35] In cryptography, key discovery (key exchange, key negotiation) is a process or protocol in which a common secret is available to two parties for later cryptographic use, usually for encrypted communication. Establishment techniques can be key agreements or key transport systems. Proposal 6. The proposed pKAS system can enable mutual authentication. Although pAKS is safer and more efficient than similar systems, the simple key tuning scheme, such as .B the zero-point multiplication operation, cheaper. It is very difficult to design a safe and easy scheme. This will be the direction of our future research. The idea of the Internet of Things (IOT) is that everything in the global network is accessible and interconnected.

Therefore, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) play a crucial role in such an environment, as they cover a wide range of applications. Such a connection can be seen from the perspective of a remote user who can access a single desired sensor node from the WSN without having to connect to a gateway node (GWN) first. This article focuses on such an environment and proposes a new user authentication and key agreement scheme for heterogeneous ad hoc wireless sensor networks. The proposed scheme allows a remote user to securely negotiate a session key with a common sensor node, using a simple key agreement protocol. The proposed scheme ensures mutual authentication between the user, the sensor node, and the gateway node (GWN), although the GWN is never contacted by the user. The proposed schema has been adapted to the WSN`s resource-constrained architecture, so it uses only simple hash and XOR calculations. The system we offer addresses these risks and ioT challenges by ensuring high security and performance features. We define , , , , , and are the feature of “secure against offline password rate attacks”, “secure against online password guessing attacks”, “provision of anonymous interactions”, “provision of transmission secrecy”, “be secure against tampering attacks”, “provide mutual authentication”, “be secure against replay attacks”, “be secure against imitation attacks”, “be secure against parallel attacks”, “be secured against internal attacks”, “achieve user unruvrability”, “important Correspondence” or “Get an offline password change”.

. . .

Open chat
En que podemos ayudarte?